

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 SALT TWO GENEVA 340

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM

SUBJ: DEPTUY MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 5, 1975.

(SALT TWO-773)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY DEPUTY MINISTER
SEMENOV AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF SEPTEMBER 5, 1975.

SEMENOV STATEMENT, SEPTEMBER 5, 1975

I

TODAY THE USSR DELEGATION INTENDS TO SET FORTH A NUMBER OF
CONSIDERATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE NEW PROPOSAL OF THE
SOVIET UNION FOR ARTICLE XIII OF THE JOINT DRAFT, TABLED
AT THE AUGUST 22, 1975 MEETING.

INCLUSION IN THE TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT
OF THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THAT ARTICLE WOULD BE OF
EXCEPTIONAL IMPORTANCE FOR ENSURING THE EFFECTIVENESS AND VIA-
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BILITY OF THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT, OVER ITS ENTIRE

TERM--FROM OCTOBER 1977 TO DECEMBER 31, 1985.

THE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS WHICH WOULD PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF WEAKENING OR CIRCUMVENTING THE LIMITATIONS BEING WORKED OUT, HAS BEEN AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT AT THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS FROM THEIR VERY INCEPTION.

IN THE COURSE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, THE SOVIET UNION HAS CONSISTENTLY ADVOCATED THAT THE SIDES ASSUME OBLIGATIONS WHICH WOULD PRECLUDE ACTIONS THAT COULD LEAD TO A SITUATION WHEN THE LIMITATIONS ASSUMED WOULD BE WEAKENED OR CIRCUMVENTED THROUGH A THIRD STATE OR THIRD STATES, OR IN ANY OTHER WAY. SUCH AN APPROACH, BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY, IS IN THE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES. IT IS DICTATED BY THE SOVIET UNION'S CONCERN FOR THE FATE OF UNIVERSAL PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, AND FOLLOWS FROM AN OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS OF EXISTING ACTUAL CONDITIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM OF LIMITING STRATEGIC ARMS.

THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-CIRCUMVENTION OF ANY AGREEMENT, AND MOST CERTAINLY OF AN AGREEMENT OF SUCH MAJOR SCOPE, IS CENTRAL AMONG THE GENERALLY RECOGNIZED TENETS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

THIS PRINCIPLE ACQUIRES EVEN GREATER IMPORTANCE WHEN DEALING WITH AGREEMENTS WHICH, IN ONE WAY OR OTHER, CONCERN MODERN SYSTEMS OF WARFARE. AND THIS IS QUITE UNDERSTANDABLE--IT STEMS FROM THE VERY SUBJECT MATTER OF SUCH AGREEMENTS. THE NATIONS HAVE TOO GREAT A STAKE IN RELIABLY BLOCKING THE CHANNELS OF CIRCUMVENTION OF SUCH AGREEMENTS, POSSIBLE UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS.

BY WAY OF ILLUSTRATION, I WOULD LIKE TO DRAW YOUR ATTENTION TO THE GREAT IMPORTANCE BOTH SIDES ATTACH TO THE PROBLEM OF FURTHER STRENGTHENING THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, I.E., ESSENTIALLY OF ENSURING NON-CIRCUMVENTION OF THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. PROOF OF THIS ARE THE REGULAR CONSULTATIONS ON THIS MATTER BETWEEN OUR STATES.

EVERYTHING BEARS WITNESS TO THE NECESSITY OF ADOPTION BY
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THE SIDES, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE NEW AGREEMENT FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL THE END OF 1985 AS WELL, OF AN OBLIGATION NOT TO UNDERTAKE ACTIONS AS A RESULT OF WHICH THE PROVISIONS BEING WORKED OUT WOULD BE WEAKENED OR CIRCUMVENTED THROUGH A THIRD STATE OR OTHER STATES, OR IN ANY OTHER WAY.

THIS IS CALLED FOR BY A BROAD STATESMANLIKE APPROACH TO THE MATTER.

THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS ARE NOT A CHANCE PHENOMENON OF CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. THEY ENSUE FROM THE HISTORICAL STAGE REACHED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRODUCTIVE FORCES, AND FROM THE FACT THAT THE STATE OF ARMAMENTS IS FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT FROM WHAT IT WAS BEFORE. AND THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS REFLECT THE MUTUAL INTEREST OF BOTH OUR STATES, AS WELL AS OF ALL PEOPLES OF THE WORLD, IN RAISING A FIRM BARRIER TO AN OUTBREAK OF

NUCLEAR WAR. THE NEW AGREEMENT UNDER PREPARATION, AS WELL, IS TO BECOME A MAJOR MILESTONE ON THE ROAD TO ACHIEVING THIS VITALLY IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE. HENCE, THE TASK OF MAKING THE AGREEMENT AS EFFECTIVE AND STABLE AS POSSIBLE. THE TASK OF RELIABLY BLOCKING THE CHANNELS FOR WEAKENING OR CIRCUMVENTING THIS AGREEMENT THROUGH A THIRD STATE OR THIRD STATES, OR IN ANY OTHER WAY, ALSO ENSUES FROM THIS.

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ATTEMPTS, UNDER SOME PRETEXT OR OTHER, TO CIRCUMVENT THE NEW AGREEMENT THROUGH A THIRD STATE OR THIRD STATES, OR IN ANY OTHER WAY, WOULD BE FRAUGHT WITH MOST SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES

FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION; AND ULTIMATELY THEY WOULD INEVITABLY TURN AGAINST THE SIDE THAT WOULD INITIATE SUCH ACTIONS.

TO LEAVE CHANNELS FOR POSSIBLE CIRCUMVENTION OR WEAKENING OF THE NEW AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS THROUGH A THIRD STATE OR THIRD STATES, OR IN ANY OTHER WAY, WOULD ALSO MEAN TO RETAIN THE SEEDS OF POSSIBLE ADVENTURES, EVEN IF THE STATES PARTY TO THE AGREEMENT DID NOT DESIRE THIS, AS WELL AS OF REINFORCING DISTRUST BETWEEN THEM. NATURALLY, IN ITS VERY ESSENCE, THIS WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE PURPOSE OF THE NEW AGREEMENT AND TO THE COURSE ALONG WHICH SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS, BASED ON A SOBER ACCOUNT OF EXISTING REALITIES, ARE CURRENTLY DEVELOPING.

THUS, THE SOVIET SIDE PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE THAT A PROVISION ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION OF THE NEW AGREEMENT THROUGH SECRET

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A THIRD STATE OR THIRD STATES, OR IN ANY OTHER WAY, MEETS PRECISELY THE MUTUAL INTERESTS OF THE SIDES AND THE INTERESTS OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AS A WHOLE.

ONE CAN DENY SUCH AN OBJECTIVE NECESSITY, BUT ONLY FROM POSITIONS WHICH HAVE NOTHING IN COMMON WITH THE GOALS OF LIMITING AND REDUCING STRATEGIC ARMS, OR THE GOALS OF DETENTE IN THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY FIELDS.

IT SHOULD BE SAID THAT IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE U.S. SIDE, TOO, HAS SPOKEN OF THE NEED TO FIND EFFECTIVE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS FOR ENSURING THE EFFECTIVENESS AND STABILITY OF A BROAD ACCORD ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

AS FAR BACK AS THE FIRST STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE U.S. TABLED A PROPOSAL THAT THE AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS "BE BASED ON AN UNDERSTANDING THAT NEITHER SIDE WOULD SEEK TO CIRCUMVENT THE PROVISIONS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AGREEMENT THROUGH A THIRD COUNTRY."

THE UNITED STATES ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED THE IMPORTANCE OF "CHANGES IN THE STRATEGIC SITUATION (INCLUDING THIRD-COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS)." PROPOSALS AIMED AT PRECLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF CIRCUMVENTING THE LIMITATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WERE SUPPORTED BY THE U.S. SIDE SUBSEQUENTLY, AS WELL.

AS A RESULT OF THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS HELD, DURING THE PERIOD AFTER 1972 AS WELL, INCLUDING THE CURRENT STAGE, THERE ARE REASONS TO BELIEVE THAT THERE IS A PROXIMITY BETWEEN THE

SIDES IN THEIR RECOGNITION OF THE ADVISABILITY AND NECESSITY OF ASSUMING OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT NOT TO UNDERTAKE ACTIONS WHICH COULD LEAD TO CIRCUMVENTION OR WEAKENING OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT.

THE NEW PROPOSAL FOR ARTICLE XIII OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT, TABLED BY THE USSR DELEGATIONS ON AUGUST 22, 1975, ON INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE DISCUSSIONS HELD. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT IT CONSTITUTES A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS FOR WORKING OUT SPECIFIC WORDING FOR ARTICLE
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XIII, IN ORDER TO INCLUDE IT IN THE DRAFT BEING WORKED OUT.

WE WOULD BE INTERESTED TO LEARN THE CONSIDERATIONS OF THE U.S. SIDE ON THIS USSR PROPOSAL.

II

THE USSR DELEGATION HAS CITED EXTENSIVE REASONABLE CONCERNING THE ADVISABILITY OF INCLUDING IN THE NEW AGREEMENT BEING PREPARED, ARTICLE XIV OF THE DOCUMENT UNDER DISCUSSION, ON NON-TRANSFER OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO THIRD STATES.

THE OBLIGATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE XIV ARE CLOSELY INTERRELATED WITH THE ENTIRE COMPLEX OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT. AT THE SAME TIME, ON CERTAIN ASPECTS THEY PROVIDE SPECIFICITY TO THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE SIDES UNDER ARTICLE XIII AND SUPPLEMENT THEM; THIS ENSUES FROM WHAT WAS SAID ABOVE.

THE NECESSITY OF REACHING MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING ON INCLUSION OF THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE XIV IN THE JOINT DRAFT UNDER PREPARATION, IS ALSO DICTATED BY A NUMBER OF SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES.

WE PROCEED FROM THE PREMISE THAT THE NON-TRANSFER PROVISION, ONCE INCORPORATED IN THE TEXT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, WOULD NOT PURSUE ONE-SIDED, BUT PRECISELY COMMON OBJECTIVES OF THE PARTIES TO IT, AND WOULD BE IN ACCORD WITH THE AIMS OF STRENGTHENING THE MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED AND OF ENHANCING TRUST BETWEEN BOTH STATES.

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IS THERE ANY NEED TO PROVE THAT TRANSFER OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO OTHER STATES, AS WELL AS ASSISTANCE TO THEM IN DEVELOPING SUCH ARMS, WOULD HAVE EXTREMELY NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES AND WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE OBJECTIVES OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS. SUCH ACTIONS, IF NOT BANNED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT, WOULD PROMOTE A BUILDUP IN THE STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES OF THIRD COUNTRIES, AND THUS, IRRESPECTIVE OF WHATEVER CALCULATIONS OF EXPEDIENCY, COULD LEAD TO DANGEROUS DESTABILIZATION OF THE STRATEGIC SITUATION, WHICH, IN TURN, WOULD RESULT IN A GENERAL INCREASE OF TENSIONS AND HEIGHTENED RISK OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR.

AN UNDERTAKING BY THE SIDES ON NON-TRANSFER WOULD BE IN LINE WITH THE ACTUAL CONDITIONS OF CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL REALITY. CONSIDERING THAT THE TASK OF COMPLEMENTING POLITICAL DETENTE BY DETENTE IN THE MILITARY FIELD IS TODAY BECOMING EVER MORE PRESSING, PRECLUSION UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT OF THE POSSIBILITY OF TRANSFERRING TO OTHER STATES STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND OF ASSISTING IN THEIR DEVELOPMENT WOULD SERVE THIS GOAL.

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THE QUESTION OF NON-TRANSFER OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

TO OTHER STATES IS ALSO MOST IMPORTANT IN THE LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT BOTH QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS ARE BEING ESTABLISHED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT. SHOULD ANY THIRD STATE BE ABLE TO DEVELOP OR SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE THE CAPABILITIES OF ITS STRATEGIC ARMS, FOR EXAMPLE, BY ACQUIRING FROM ONE OF THE SIDES MODERN TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OR THEIR COMPONENTS, TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS OR BLUEPRINTS, THIS WOULD MEAN, IN ESSENCE, CIRCUMVENTION OF THE NEW AGREEMENT WITH REGARD TO ITS QUANTITATIVE LIMITATIONS, AS WELL AS IN A BROADER SENSE.

POSITIVE RESOLUTION IN THE NEW AGREEMENT OF THE QUESTION OF NON-TRANSFER WOULD PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH CIRCUMVENTION, AND WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS AND VIABILITY OF THE LIMITATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT, IN THEIR ENTIRE SCOPE.

OF COURSE, THIS WOULD BE IMPORTANT NOT MERELY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT; IT WOULD ALSO BE IN ACCORD BOTH WITH THE SPIRIT AND LETTER OF THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS MENTIONED HERE, WHICH IS ALSO VERY IMPORTANT.

THE OBLIGATIONS ON NON-TRANSFER, RECORDED IN THE NEW AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT, CONSTITUTING A DEFINITE BARRIER TO THE SPREAD OF STRATEGIC ARMS, WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO PREVENTING AN OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR, AND, CONSEQUENTLY, WOULD ALSO BE OF IMPORTANCE IN BROAD INTERNATIONAL TERMS.

THE SOVIET SIDE REAFFIRMS AGAIN ITS POSITION ON THE NECESSITY OF INCLUDING THE OBLIGATIONS ON NON-TRANSFER, PROVIDED FOR UNDER ARTICLE XIV OF THE JOINT DOCUMENT OF MAY 7, 1975, IN THE DOCUMENT BEING WORKED OUT.

III

MR. AMBASSADOR,

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ONE OF THE MAIN PRINCIPLES WHICH WILL LIE AT THE BASIS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IS THE MUTUALLY AGREED PRINCIPLE OF VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT. THIS FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE IS REFLECTED IN THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE XVII OF THE JOINT DOCUMENT OF MAY 7, 1975.

THE SIDES HAVE REACHED COMPLETE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING

WITH RESPECT TO THE FIRST TWO PARAGRAPHS OF THAT ARTICLE.

MUCH ATTENTION HAS ALSO BEEN DEVOTED TO DISCUSSING THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE XVII, PAR. 3. IN PARTICULAR, AS WE UNDERSTAND THE DISCUSSIONS, GREAT IMPORTANCE IS BEING ATTACHED TO THE FIRST SENTENCE OF THAT PARAGRAPH, WHICH CONCERNS THE OBLIGATION OF THE SIDES NOT TO USE DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES WHICH IMPEDE VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT. IN THIS CONNECTION, I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE TERM ITSELF, "DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES," HAD BEEN ACCEPTED EARLIER AFTER BEING PROPOSED BY PRECISELY THE U.S. SIDE.

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EXPERIENCE SHOWS THAT THERE IS NO NEED TO CLARIFY THE CONCEPT "DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES"--IT IS CLEAR IN ITSELF. BOTH THE FORM AND CONTENT OF THIS CONCEPT HAVE BEEN SANCTIONED IN THE COURSE OF THE LONG PERIOD OF COMPLIANCE BY THE SIDES WITH THE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE AGREEMENTS IN FORCE--THE ABM TREATY AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. THE SOVIET DELEGATION ADDRESSED THIS QUESTION ON AUGUST 19, 1975. WE

PROCEED FROM THE PREMISE THAT DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES ARE THOSE MEASURES OF CONCEALMENT, WHICH ARE DELIBERATELY AIMED AT IMPEDING VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATIONS TO BE ESTABLISHED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT.

AS FOR THE LAST SENTENCE OF PAR. 3 OF THE ARTICLE UNDER DISCUSSION, THE SOVIET SIDE HAS REPEATEDLY DEMONSTRATED IN A COMPREHENSIVE AND WELL-REASONED WAY THE GROUNDLESSNESS OF INTRODUCING INTO THE TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT THE AMBIGUOUS CONCEPT OF SO-CALLED "MEASURES AND PRACTICES WHICH RESULT IN UNINTENTIONALLY IMPEDING VERIFICATION" OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT. WE ALSO
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EXPRESSED THE SOVIET SIDE'S COMPLETELY DEFINITE, NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TO THE CONTENT OF THE PROPOSED STATEMENT IN CONNECTION WITH ARTICLE XVIII, PAR. 3.

THERE IS MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE SIDES THAT ALL THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE XVII, INCLUDING ITS PAR. 3, WILL APPLY TO ALL THE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT, COMPLIANCE WITH WHICH MUST BE VERIFIED BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION.

WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THERE IS EVERY REASON TO ADOPT FOR THE NEW AGREEMENT THE FORMULA USED IN THE ABM TREATY AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, WHICH HAS PROVED TO BE VIABLE, CLEAR AND CORRECT. JOHNSON

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